The Sir Creek Dispute Between India and Pakistan

 

Historical Background

The Sir Creek dispute dates back to the colonial era and stems from ambiguous boundary agreements made under British rule. In 1908, the princely state of Kutch (in present-day India) and the Sindh province (in present-day Pakistan) quarreled over rights in the Sir Creek area. The British administration attempted to settle this with a 1914 resolution by the Government of Bombay but this document was internally contradictory. The map attached to the 1914 resolution placed the boundary along the eastern bank of Sir Creek (implying the entire creek fell in Sindh, now Pakistan), whereas the textual description stated that the border ran mid-channel according to the thalweg principle, the idea that a navigable river’s boundary follows its deepest channel. This unresolved ambiguity laid the groundwork for future disputes.

Upon Partition in 1947, Sindh became part of Pakistan and Kutch (later part of Gujarat) remained in India, but no clear demarcation of Sir Creek was achieved. Tensions over the marshy Rann of Kutch region (adjacent to Sir Creek) led to a brief armed clash in 1965. A UN-sponsored tribunal in 1968 adjudicated the Rann of Kutch boundary, awarding about 90% of the disputed territory to India. Crucially, however, that 1968 award explicitly excluded Sir Creek from its scope, leaving the creek’s boundary unresolved. From the mouth of Sir Creek to the top of Sir Creek, the border remains undefined. What seemed a minor leftover dispute at the time would later gain outsized importance with the advent of modern maritime rights.

Geographic Significance and Strategic Importance

Sir Creek is a 96-kilometer-long tidal estuary in the uninhabited marshlands of the Indus River delta. It forms the boundary between India’s Gujarat state and Pakistan’s Sindh province, emptying into the Arabian Sea. The area is remote and inhospitable – a flat expanse of salt flats and mangrove swamps periodically flooded by the tides. This geography made the creek historically obscure, but it also means the boundary through it was never demarcated on the ground. The creek’s course can shift slightly over time, and its marshy terrain is difficult to patrol or fence, which has turned Sir Creek into a potential gap in border security. Indian and Pakistani border forces have to contend with the harsh marsh environment and shifting rivulets while maintaining vigil.

Strategically, Sir Creek’s location is highly significant because it sits near the mouth of the Arabian Sea and in proximity to Pakistan’s major port city Karachi. Control of the creek influences access to key sea routes – Indian officials have pointed out that one route to Karachi passes through Sir Creek, underlining its strategic value. If India holds the boundary along the mid-channel, it serves as a buffer protecting Gujarat’s coast and also places Indian naval presence closer to Karachi’s approaches. From Pakistan’s perspective, if the boundary were pushed to the east bank (giving Pakistan full control of the creek), it would gain a modest strategic advantage: in a conflict, Pakistani forces could operate slightly further east, potentially threatening India’s Kutch region or even attempting a pincer movement from the south. Moreover, control of Sir Creek helps the Pakistan Navy extend its patrols and surveillance closer to the Indian coastline. Thus, while the creek itself has little military value, its surroundings can serve as a launching point or intrusion route in war, making both sides sensitive about each other’s activities there.

Economically and ecologically, Sir Creek also carries importance. The creek’s waters and the surrounding sea are rich fishing grounds, among the largest in the region. Thousands of fishermen from coastal Gujarat and Sindh make their livelihood in these waters. However, due to the undefined boundary, they often unintentionally cross into the other country’s domain; as a result, fishermen arrests are a routine friction between India and Pakistan. The sea floor off Sir Creek is also believed to hold significant oil and natural gas reserves. Both countries are eager to explore and exploit these hydrocarbons, but exploration has been on hold pending a boundary resolution. In effect, whoever prevails in the Sir Creek dispute would gain access to potentially lucrative undersea resources. Finally, the creek lies in the Indus delta ecosystem, home to mangrove forests and migratory birds. Joint environmental management is virtually non-existent due to the territorial dispute. Thus, a resolution could also benefit ecological conservation an aspect some experts argue could be a platform for confidence-building. In sum, what looks on the map like a tiny ribbon of water snakes through a marsh is actually loaded with strategic, economic, and environmental significance far larger than its size.

Legal and Diplomatic Positions of India and Pakistan

At the heart of the Sir Creek dispute is a difference in how India and Pakistan interpret historical documents and legal principles. Pakistan’s position is that the boundary lies along the eastern bank of Sir Creek effectively claiming the entire creek for itself. Islamabad bases this claim on the 1914 Bombay resolution, particularly one clause which stated that the eastern bank of the creek was the divider between Sindh and Kutch. Pakistan argues that this clause and the map drawn in 1914 should be treated as the final word, meaning the creek belongs entirely to Sindh (Pakistan) and the land border meets the sea at the creek’s eastern shore.

India’s position, in contrast, is that the boundary should run through the middle of the creek (the mid-channel) in accordance with international river-boundary law. New Delhi points out that the 1914 resolution’s text itself invoked the thalweg principle for navigable waterways, which would place the boundary in the middle of the main channel. India maintains that Sir Creek was considered navigable (at least at high tide), so this principle applies. In support of its case, India cites a 1925 survey map and the fact that British authorities in 1924 actually installed concrete pillars along the mid-channel to mark the boundary. In other words, even the colonial administration ultimately treated the creek’s midpoint as the border, which bolsters India’s claim. Indian officials also note that international law generally favors the mid-channel (thalweg) demarcation for boundaries in tidal or navigable rivers.

Pakistan counters these arguments by asserting that Sir Creek is not truly navigable (it’s a tidal channel that boats cannot navigate year-round), thus claiming the thalweg doctrine is irrelevant in this case. From Pakistan’s perspective, since the creek was not a consistently navigable river, the 1914 map’s delineation along the east bank should stand. Pakistani analysts also raise the point that the creek’s course has shifted over the decades; they worry that using the current mid-channel as the border could deprive Pakistan of some land that used to lie on its side before the shifts. As a result, Pakistan has been reluctant to accept a moving mid-channel boundary.

Diplomatically, each side has stuck firmly to its interpretation. Pakistan at times proposed resolving the stalemate through international arbitration or adjudication, feeling that neutral legal experts might favor its case. India has rejected third-party intervention, citing the 1972 Simla Agreement between the two countries which stipulates that all disputes must be settled bilaterally without outside involvement. India’s stance is that the facts on record (the 1914 textual clause, the 1925 map and boundary pillars, etc.) clearly favor the mid-channel boundary, and that the role of any negotiator is simply to demarcate where the border already is not to split the difference or apply new equitable principles. In essence, New Delhi argues the historical boundary was along the creek, whereas Islamabad argues there never was a clear boundary and that fairness dictates a split down the middle of the Rann (which for Pakistan means along the creek’s eastern edge in this sector).

Many neutral observers note that India’s view aligns with the thalweg principle, a well-recognized norm in international boundary law. Indeed, when applying this principle, the outcome is favorable to India: analyses have shown that treating the mid-channel as the border would shift the land/sea terminus westwards to India’s benefit, costing Pakistan a substantial area of maritime zone. Pakistan’s case leans on a literal reading of one colonial-era clause and the argument that Sir Creek’s nature (tidal and shifting) makes the usual river boundary rules inapplicable. Neither side is willing to concede, as the stakes – while modest in land terms are magnified by the waters and resources attached to the creek.

UNCLOS and Maritime Boundary Implications

The Sir Creek dispute is not just about a sliver of land; it has major implications for the maritime boundaries of India and Pakistan. The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the concept of a 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) for coastal states. Within an EEZ, a nation has special rights to exploit marine resources such as fish, oil, and gas. Both India and Pakistan are parties to UNCLOS, and thus each is entitled to an EEZ extending into the Arabian Sea but the extent of that zone depends on where their land border meets the sea. Sir Creek is exactly that meeting point on their western coast. A difference of a few kilometers at the creek could translate into a difference of several thousand square kilometers of offshore territory for the two countries.

If India’s mid-channel claim is accepted, the coastal baseline for drawing the sea boundary shifts slightly westward, giving India a larger wedge of the Arabian Sea and pushing Pakistan’s maritime boundary correspondingly further west. Conversely, if Pakistan’s claim to the east bank holds, Pakistan would gain a bit more sea area at India’s expense. This is why control of Sir Creek gained renewed importance after 1982, when EEZ rights became a factor. What once seemed a petty creek in a marsh now potentially unlocks access to rich fishing grounds and subsea energy deposits, depending on whose map is used.

UNCLOS also put some pressure on both countries to resolve such disputes. The Convention required states to submit their offshore territorial claims by a 2009 deadline. As that date approached, India and Pakistan intensified talks to define their maritime boundary around Sir Creek. In the 2000s, technical delegations from both sides conducted joint hydrographic surveys of the creek and its approaches. By 2007–2008, they had even exchanged charts and prepared a joint map of the area. These steps were aimed at reaching a mutually agreed boundary line in time for UNCLOS submissions. However, despite these efforts, a conclusive agreement was not reached by 2009.

Under UNCLOS, unresolved maritime boundaries can eventually trigger arbitration if one party seeks it. Yet in this case neither India nor Pakistan was keen to internationalize the issue – India, especially, holds that bilateral issues should be solved one-on-one (per the Simla Agreement). Thus, the 2009 UNCLOS deadline passed with Sir Creek still unsettled. Both countries made formal submissions to the UN regarding their continental shelf claims without a final maritime boundary in this sector. The UNCLOS context nevertheless looms large: it means that as long as Sir Creek’s status is unresolved, a segment of the maritime boundary in the Arabian Sea also remains undefined. This uncertainty hampers the ability to fully exploit resources and underscores that a narrow creek’s fate will determine who controls hundreds of square miles of the sea and seabed beyond.

Recent Developments, Negotiations, and Standoffs

Over the past few decades, India and Pakistan have engaged in numerous rounds of negotiations to resolve the Sir Creek issue. From 1997 to 2012, at least a dozen rounds of talks were held as part of a broader dialogue on bilateral disputes. These talks made some technical progress – as noted, a joint survey and demarcation exercises were conducted, and in 2008 both sides reportedly agreed on a draft map of the creek’s alignment. By 2012, observers even suggested the dispute was “technically resolved” in principle, awaiting a political sign-off. However, domestic and geopolitical events (such as the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks and subsequent chill in India-Pakistan relations) derailed the momentum. No final treaty or delimitation has been signed to date.

Meanwhile, the area has seen occasional standoffs and incidents that underscore underlying tensions. A notorious example was the 1999 Atlantique incident, in which an Indian Air Force jet shot down a Pakistan Navy surveillance plane over Sir Creek after it allegedly strayed into Indian airspace. The episode, coming shortly after the Kargil conflict, inflamed tempers; Pakistan claimed the plane was unarmed and in its own airspace, while India insisted it had intruded. The dispute remains a sore point.

More frequently, the tensions play out in the form of fishermen arrests and border patrol encounters. Dozens of Indian and Pakistani fishermen are arrested every year near Sir Creek, accused of crossing the invisible maritime line while fishing – a humanitarian issue that both governments have acknowledged but tied to the larger resolution of the boundary. Patrol boats from both sides sometimes chase or seize each other’s fishing vessels, though these incidents usually de-escalate after diplomatic intervention. The unresolved status also raises security concerns: in 2019, the Indian Army found several abandoned Pakistani boats in Sir Creek, leading to a high alert over a suspected infiltration attempt via the sea route. That same year, India’s border forces reported that Pakistan had rapidly upgraded military infrastructure near the creek – building new forward posts, deploying fast attack craft, and stationing additional troops. India responded by strengthening its own surveillance and quick-reaction capabilities in the area.

The dispute saw renewed public attention in late 2025 when high-ranking officials issued stark warnings. In October 2025, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh cautioned Pakistan against any “misadventure” in the Sir Creek region, vowing that any attempt to grab territory would invite a severe response that could “change both history and geography.” He also reiterated that India is open to a peaceful resolution of Sir Creek as long as Pakistan shows sincerity but that India will not tolerate aggression. Pakistan, for its part, has generally maintained that it wants an equitable settlement and has occasionally accused India of intransigence.

Current Status: The Sir Creek dispute remains unresolved but peaceful. Both nations continue to assert their claims while tacitly respecting a de facto interim arrangement. No third-party mediation is in play due to India’s stance under the Simla Agreement, and neither side appears ready to compromise. The only viable path forward is through bilateral dialogue and compromise whenever the political climate allows. A potential resolution could involve a negotiated boundary somewhere between the two claims or a creative solution such as turning the creek into a joint fishing or ecological zone.

For now, Sir Creek stands as a small but symbolically and strategically significant piece of the complex India-Pakistan puzzle a reminder that even minor-looking disputes can carry major importance due to geography and the evolving laws of the sea. Any agreement will have to address both nations’ legal arguments and security concerns, likely granting Pakistan face-saving recognition of past agreements while affirming the mid-channel principle that India insists on. Until that happens, Sir Creek will continue to meander through maps and diplomacy, unresolved but not forgotten.